Abstract. Can we still talk today about a therapeutically dimension of philosophy? To what extent does Heidegger's philosophy exhibit such a dimension? And how can we reconcile this aspect of Heidegger’s thought with his political involvement in 1933? These are some of the questions starting from which I will try to show that Heidegger’s philosophical thought presupposes indeed a therapeutic that the thinker assumed even in his own life, a life that is not reducible to his 'unforgivable failure' in 1933. I will begin with an account of Being and Time’s existential analytic, the main thread of which is the distinction between Dasein’s authenticity and inauthenticity. Next I will try to grasp some of the importance of Heidegger’s investigation regarding Dasein’s determination as a 'thinker and speaker of being (Sein)', that is, regarding ec-sistence. I will then try to account for the meaning of the 'question regarding technology' and implicitly Heidegger’s solution regarding overcoming the condition of a 'gregarious slave of Ge-stell' through cultivation of the so-called 'poetic theology’. I will conclude by signaling some life-file elements of the 'faithless monk from the Black Forest' (as Heidegger is sometimes called), elements that signal a certain correspondence between the philosopher's life and the therapeutic aspect present implicitly in his philosophy.

Key-words: Dasein’s authenticity and inauthenticity, being-in-the-world, being-with (Mitsein), the world of the anonymous They (das Man), Ge-stell (the essence of technology), Ἀλήθεια, the-godding-of-gods.

What is the point of Philosophy for the age of the world in which we live? What is the point of poets in poor times? Hölderlin asked. A poor world indeed since it is a world in which everyone’s wish for self-assertion prevails and in which even intelligence becomes a feverish state, and love, as Sartre has already said it, becomes a mere manifestation of the will to conquer the other’s consciousness in order to submit his / her liberty to mine. Was, Hölderlin, maybe, right when he stated that …where danger is, there also rises that which brings salvation? Heidegger and a few French phenomenologists have answered affirmatively to this question. The issue of salvation presupposes, of course, therapy. But, can philosophy be understood nowadays as having a therapeutic dimension, that spiritual modality able to revive, to build or to form the one that follows it? Even Hegel saw in philosophy a rational science, the German philosopher confessing the need to renounce to the traditional understanding of the love of wisdom, in favor of real knowledge. In the century that followed after Hegel, the century of analytical thinking, associating philosophy with therapy became definitely risky. This risk, however, was taken up in 20th century philosophy by French phenomenology and philosophical hermeneutics, which develops the possibility of sharing meaning and tackles the issues of the recognition of the other and of the constitution of the self by reference to otherness.
A valuable breakthrough in this matter is made by Husserl in one of his later writings, *The Phenomenology of the Communication Community* 1, where, to the approaches developed in the fifth *Cartesian Meditation*, regarding the possibility and the grounds of communication, i.e., 'the intentional constitution of the other' through 'apperception', *The Phenomenology of the Communication Community* adds an exploration of communication as participation to a shared meaning, in a cultural environment, through *speech* marked by the presence of empathy.

As far as French phenomenology is concerned, certain arguments presupposed by this philosophical domain can be related to some Heideggerian views regarding the hermeneutical circle, Being-with, or with freedom as the letting-be, the technical disposal of the world or language as medium for sharing spiritual life. I have in mind here especially Emmanuel Lévinas and Jean Luc Marion.

At the level of a so-called *metaphysical ethics*, Lévinas tries to disclose the condition of the fellow, the authentic manifestation of freedom being presupposed by the confession of my responsibility towards the other (...). When, looking at him, the face of the other enters into my consciousness, it upsets me, because it awakens in me the memory of my injustice from many meetings with my peers. It awakens me, my self becoming aware of the need to replicate to the call of the other, through a service; ‘Do not kill!’ or ‘You shall love your neighbor!’, they do not prescribe only the violence of murder, they imply all the slow and invisible murders that are committed in our desires and flaws in all of life's ‘innocent’ cruelties, in our knowingly indifference... 2

When reading these lines it is worth reminding ourselves that they were written by someone for whom the other had not had for a while a face because ‘le mal n’a pas de visage’. 3 The specific other that Lévinas has here in mind names supporters of National Socialism, a force that has destroyed too much in the life of this thinker as well, yet could not destroy Lévinas need to study especially the presence of the other, through face and language. Maybe, indeed, we must lose certain things as gifts in order to conquer them as virtues!

Jean Luc Marion is concerned, on the one hand, with the possibility of enriching one’s personal life through admitting the importance of *eros* in assuming the presence of the other in the field of our vision, and on the other, with recovering, in order to surpass, the problematic matters of *image civilization*, the human possibility to open oneself towards the saturated *phenomenon*, which is invisible, yet 'fills the soul beyond its capacity'4. In the end, it is about the signification of the acceptance of the saturated phenomenon of revelation in what the authentic recovery of the other’s proximity is concerned.

As mentioned, Heidegger has a special influence on these thinkers’ discourse. Still, to what extent can one find in Heidegger’s philosophy the therapeutic impulse for the constitution of the self? And even if we find such an impulse in his major works, did Heidegger himself assume it in his life? In what follows, we specifically attempt to offer a possible answer to these questions. I take the directions of Heideggerian *therapeutics* to refer to matters such as: the distinction between *Dasein*’s authenticity and inauthenticity, assuming

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the other authentically through Being-with, surpassing an exclusively technical experience of the world through acknowledging the \textit{essence of technology} and through \textit{poetic meditation}, recovering what was lost through metaphysics, the \textit{godding of the gods}. I begin by addressing only two of these directions.

The basic criterion of the existential analytic in \textit{Being and Time} (1927) is the distinction between \textit{Dasein}'s authenticity and inauthenticity. In this sense, the Heideggerian guiding question is: How is it possible to attain authenticity? To answer this, Heidegger starts by saying that \textit{Dasein} is the being to which its being is given as a task; it is that privileged state in which a human being lives the destiny of \textit{to be}. It is known that, later on, Heidegger radicalizes this argument, adding that essential thinking, poetic uttering, the act of founding a state, and the sacrificing deed that produces history are the privileged authentic modalities of human manifestation as \textit{Dasein}. As Gabriel Liiceanu repeatedly states\textsuperscript{5}, as soon as he installs himself mechanically in what exists around him, preferring to be in control of beings and to declare himself their master, man ceases to be \textit{Dasein}, and thus betrays his own being.

The possibilities that regard \textit{Dasein}'s constitution of being, in their interrelations, name the \textit{being-in-the-world}. For Heidegger this is akin to being around something familiar that is taken into care. As \textit{being-in-the-world Dasein} is at the same time and in each instant engaged in a threefold relation: with things, especially as tools, with other \textit{Daseins}, and with himself. By critically distancing himself from the modern understanding offered to man as subject, Heidegger sees in \textit{Dasein}, a certain ‘embrace\textsuperscript{6}’ which gathers together everything that surrounds us. That is why \textit{Dasein} is considered at the same time as \textit{Being-with (Mitsein)}, \textit{Dasein}'s worldhood being given as With-world \textit{(-die- Mitwelt)}.

But the characteristic of encountering the \textit{others} is, after all, orientated toward one’s own Da-sein. Does not it, too, start with the distinction and isolation of the ‘I’, so that a transition from this isolated subject to the others must then be sought? In order to avoid this misunderstanding, we must observe in what sense we are talking about the \textit{others}. ‘The others’ does not mean everybody else but me – those from whom the I distinguish itself. They are, rather, those from whom one mostly does \textit{not} distinguish oneself, those among whom one is, too. This being-there-too with them does not have the ontological character of being objectively present ‘with’ them within a world. The ‘with’ is of the character of Da-sein (…) On the basis of this like-with being-in-the-world, the world is always already the one that I share with the others. The world of Da-sein is a with-world. Being-in is being-with others.\textsuperscript{7}

Being-in-the-world, as fundamental structure of \textit{Dasein}, actually presupposes three capacities. The first two are \textit{understanding} and \textit{state-of-mind}. Understanding refers to \textit{Dasein}'s capacity to project and portray the possible, while state-of-mind to the affective tonality with which \textit{Dasein} accompanies its facticity, i.e. the situations through which it already is in the world, circumstances in which it has been projected, thrown. Understanding and state-of-mind are co-original as they define the equilibrium between projecting and being projected which gives meaning to \textit{Dasein}'s fact of being. However free we might be, we will never be able to

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escape our state-of-mind and however aware we might be of our facticity we still can never completely avoid our encounter with our possible. The third sub-structure of being-in-the-world is the fall (Verfallen), i.e. Dasein’s fall from itself under the domination of other beings, a fall, in fact, in the automatism of man’s movements through his days. The fall expresses the structure of Being of Dasein installed in its inauthenticity and in which – if it is not visited by anxiety – it can very well remain forever.8

Dasein finds itself surrounded by people and objects, always ‘caught’, ‘arrested’ through the other beings, in the midst of which one lives the danger of loosing oneself. Feeling at home with the things and people around, Dasein tends to understand itself, not starting from itself, but from other beings. Dasein behaves and thinks like others, living in the world of the anonymous They (das Man), a world of everyone and no one, in which one wastes oneself. A big part of Dasein’s behavior enters under the dictatorship of the They, with its neutral face, without identity.

What does this impersonal world impose? Firstly, the distancing from the self; then, mediocrity – any excess of originality being silently annihilated; thirdly, the leveling of the possibilities of being and of the decisions that a human being takes: the impersonal everydayness already has fabricated decisions, which ensures that inauthentic Dasein has fled every responsibility. This discharge of accountability is easily being done in the sphere of non-familiarity with the self and of mediocrity, because behind the They there is, in fact, nobody to answer. And this transformation of everybody into nobody is, actually, the most spectacular thing that can happen to Dasein. But this happens only due to the fact that everydayness is part of Dasein’s structure of being.

(…) as everyday being-with-one-another, Da-sein stands in subservience to the others. It itself is not; the others have taken its being away from it. The everyday possibilities of being of Da-sein are at the disposal of the whims of the others. These others are not definite others. On the contrary, any other can represent them. What is decisive is only the inconspicuous domination by others that Da-sein as being-with has already taken over unawares. One belongs to the others oneself, and entrenches their power. ‘The others’, whom one designates as such in order to cover over one’s own essential belonging to them, are those who are there initially and for the most part everyday in being-with-one-another. The who is not this one and not that one, not oneself and not some and not the sum of them all. The ‘who’ is the neuter, the they.9

The articulation of being-in-the-world is done at the level of speech. The distinction between speaking, listening and silence is important: inauthenticity makes itself present especially at the level of speaking, when talking is permeated by idle talk, undifferentiated curiosity, and ambiguity; authentic Dasein opens itself mostly through listening, which is not only the phonic reception, but catching of a meaning and silence (this is not understood as a void of noise, but as an absence full of meaning).

As I have already mentioned, for Heidegger constituting the self is only possible through the passage from inauthenticity to authenticity. Dasein cannot however install itself in authenticity once and for all. As self-transcendence, Dasein’s being is given to him as a task, as each time having to be etc., all these do not allow objectification and a supposed

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9 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 112.
continuity of authenticity: Dasein’s being is born each moment from its confrontation with its modalities and possibilities of being. Still, what does surpassing the inauthentic modality of existence really mean? Since Dasein is Mitsein, authenticity cannot be understood independently of other Daseins, but rather only with the consciousness of the distinction from others, namely insofar as one goes beyond the everyday condition in which the self is lost from sight, more exactly, it is melted in the common realm of das Man. How is this surpassing possible? Through anxiety! One can happen to stop from his running away from his own self when anxiety, seen as fear of something undetermined, intervenes. Suddenly, things in the world become insignificant. Suddenly, the world reveals itself to the one that reaches such a state as devoid of meaning, as nothing. Anxiety, says Heidegger, places Dasein ahead of itself and thus Dasein unfolds itself as possible being, as care, which integrates the existentials of Dasein’s constitution, being at the same time the ground of Dasein’s co-originary structures. We thus encounter a change of accent, from fall (Vorfallen) to project (Entwurf).

In a way anxiety determines even self-awareness. Actually, passing from the impersonal self to the authentic self means for Heidegger the manifestation of conscience and this presupposes resoluteness. Now, the self decides regarding what Being-in-the-world means for him. Dasein’s decisions do not show him in isolation from the world; rather, they presuppose being authentic in a world and Being-with-others. By deciding and choosing itself, “Dasein becomes free for its world: it lets others in turn be in their most proper possibility of being, and transforms the Mitsein in an authentic ‘togetherness’”.10

What does acknowledging our possibilities mean while being at the same time withworld? In order to answer, Heidegger launches an apparently paradoxical affirmation: any possibility of Dasein is connected to an absolute impossibility. He has in mind one’s ownmost possibility, the possibility of death, the possibility of the impossibility to be. Dasein is Being-toward-death in the sense of acknowledging that death could occur at any moment: If it is true that I can die any moment, how do I shape my behavior and my life? Under the watch and consciousness of the possible end it is possible to build an authentic present. This means that only by starting from the possibility of ceasing to be does Dasein assume himself and his possibilities according to his constitution of being, as Mitwelt.

As the non-relational possibility, death individualizes, but only, as the possibility not-to-be-bypassed, in order to make Da-sein as being-with understand the potentialities-of-being of the others. Because anticipation of the possibility not-to-be-bypassed also disclosed all the possibilities lying before it, this anticipation includes the possibility of taking the whole of Da-sein in advance in an existentiell way, that is, the possibility of existing as whole potentiality-of-being.11

Pre-emerging signifies both the possibility to understand, i.e. the extreme power of to be, and the condition of possibility of authentic existence.

Our analysis can be extended, of course, to the Heideggerian perspective of Dasein’s temporality, especially, considering the distinction between, on the one hand, Dasein’s intratemporality, whereby by losing itself in das Man, Dasein lives with the clock in his hand, by submitting time to calculus and measurement, and, on the other hand, authentic temporality,

in which care unfolds discloses the true meaning of Dasein’s authenticity. Due to reasons that regard the economy of the paper I shall not insist presently on this distinction.

Marks of a certain Heideggerian therapeutics can also be identified after the famous ‘turn’ from 1929-1930. For instance, in *The Question Concerning Technology* (1953), Heidegger tries to face the danger humans are confronted with i.e. experiencing the world only from a technical perspective. For the modern individual ‘being able becomes the criterion for science’ says Heidegger, and being able means having things at one’s disposal. In the technical approach of the world, of nature, everything becomes present only from the perspective of availableness and ability to submit to order, everything becomes *available situatedness*. That is why, in order to name the essence of modern technology, Heidegger uses the term *Ge-stell*, understood, not as ‘device’, as in its current usage, but as setting-upon, framing, ordering, standing-reserve.

The fact that now, wherever we try to point to modern technology as the revealing that challenges, the words ‘setting-upon’, ‘ordering’, ‘standing-reserve’, obtrude and accumulate in a dry, monotonous, and therefore oppressive way – this fact has its basis in what is now coming to utterance. 12

*Ge-stell* gives man the possibility to be proud and to shape himself as master of things, but it also turns him into available situatedness: he becomes work material on the labor market, sickly material for medical clinics etc. In reducing his behavior to the technical sphere of life, the human individual does not realize that he himself is monopolized by *Ge-stell*. He does not, however, experience this monopoly accordingly with his limited validity. Moreover, as Otto Pöggeler states that ‘the true danger of this danger resides in the fact that it gives rise to the apparent lack of danger’.13

Heidegger distinguishes between technology and the essence of technology. He does this by methodically referring to the language of the Greeks. Thus he identifies in technology a modality to produce, which for the Pre-Socratics meant to disclose: with *techné*, as producing, we therefore find ourselves in *άλήθεια*. By confronting it with its essence, technology must only be seen as one of the modalities through which being as logos and as truth unfolds itself.

Enframing means the way of revealing that holds sway in the essence of modern technology and that is itself nothing technological. On the other hand, all those things that are so familiar to us and are standard parts of assembly, such as rods, pistons, and chassis, belong to the technological. (...) In enframing, the unconcealment appropriates in conformity with which the work of modern technology reveals the actual as standing-reserve.14

Heidegger uses *aletheia* initially to mean simply truth and disclosing the Being of entities or *unfolding*, later on he uses *aletheia* as *logos* and as place of opening, which puts in agreement being and thinking, their arrival to presence one to the other and one for other.

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The relation of *Dasein* with the being that gives itself logos supposes the *letting-be*, which does not mean submission, abandon, giving up on something etc. on Dasein's part, but rather their contrary. *Letting-be* means situating yourself (as *ec-sistent*) in the disclosure of being as being, in *aletheia*. Heidegger warns that ‘out of concealment of being as being, in itself, while hiding, being as a whole’ (Heidegger, 1977, p. 61). This is for Heidegger the mystery of being. The *mystery* is not an enigma that could ever be revealed, merely naming the state of de-closeness, on the basis of which the disclosure of being as such produces itself. This means that being, both reveals and conceals itself. By unfolding itself, it gives itself as truth; closeness is related to the fact that *folding* is a characteristic of entities in their unity and thus precedes any knowledge. Any unfolding can occur only on the bases of the closeness. *Mystery* names this game between folding and unfolding in which the *Dasein* is caught.

Preoccupied exclusively with being, Western thought forgets about mystery; the foldness does not represent for it a theme for study. The Western metaphysics, from Plato and Aristotle, started from the immediate reality of objects and processes, without being preoccupied with what makes it possible.15

In the conferences comprised in the volume entitled *On The Essence Of Language*, Heidegger says that, in fact, we inhabit the language, being familiarized with it: because we inhabit *logos*. But this inhabiting is not passive: being as *aletheia* needs *Dasein* in order to express itself, it needs man’s word which, through articulated sound, expresses significations at the level of thought which the world and its being can have for *Dasein*, as *spiritual man*. Here, Heidegger encounters Heraclitus and his thought about *logos*: in its original quality, language is *logos*, it is a *bringing together* of silence, without sound: through it the human individual is given the capacity to utter ‘is’. In these circumstances *logos* comprises something which is deeper than ‘language’, as it is explained through appeal to human activity. The philosopher adds even more: language, as essential uttering, as a way of emergence in an event of unfolding, reaches human speaking only when this speaking recognizes at its borders the *presence of silence* as well: only through the silence that experiences what remains folded, in relation to what is unfolded, language, as essential uttering, represents the *house of being*.

How does the man that blindly submits to project of technology look like? He is the one entered in leveling and uniformity, the one that cultivates production for the sake of production (...). the capacity to calculate, to organize is now certainly exercised into an instinct. Anything seems to be available and accessible, nothing is unsolvable; the solution is just a matter of time (...). The mob slave of Ge-stell is fast and proves the unceasing unrest of the organized individual: the instability of interests, the accelerated succession of activities, the quest for novelty at any price— all these characterize him.16

Thus, as Heidegger puts it:

Modern technology pushes toward the greatest possible perfection. Perfection is based on the thoroughgoing calculability of objects. The calculability of objects presupposes the unqualified validity of the principium raciones. It is in this way that the authority characteristic of the principle of reason determines the essence of the modern, technological age.  

Heidegger insists, however, that *to be means to inhabit*: does man still inhabit, since he has lost the familiarity with himself? ‘The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is Buan, dwelling. To be human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell’. Therefore what should be done, in the age of expansion of the ‘technological straying’ at a global scale? It is from acknowledging the essence of technology, not renouncing it (it would be, however, impossible!), that man’s salvation could start in the midst of the age of technology, namely through the recovery of authentic familiarity with the self through the kind of meditation aiming at *aletheia*; also through the re-discovery of the meaning of *language* as ‘the house of being’. And because the poet is the ‘friend of the house of the world’, frequenting the rhapsode poet is one of the solutions. For as long as poetry exists, language cannot be reduced to a merely instrumental function and it will not be brought to clichés imposed through media. Moreover, for Heidegger’s entire later work, the poet is *Dasein* projected by being, to take care of the being’. Compared to him, the thinker is powerless, because ‘he knows that technique continues its movement’. ‘In poor times that which lasts is built by poets’ – Heidegger says repeating one of Hölderlin’s verses. For ‘poetic constructions find through building the essence of dwelling’. In other words, in addition to acknowledging the essence of technology, the neighboring of the rhapsode poet, who prepares the arrival of the gods and builds everything that lasts, and philosophical meditation on poetry represent, at this stage in Heidegger’s thought, the solution with therapeutic value in the thought aiming at the recovery of *Dasein’s* familiarity with itself.

For Heidegger, modernity did not impose only a perspective on the world based on the subject-object relation, but also *de-divinization* – ‘the death of God’ or the desacralization of the world. As Alain Renaut notes,

the relation of this phenomenon (through humanism) to human development as a subject is achieved naturally: what in antiquity, and especially in medieval times was considered to be ‘the place of God’, in modern times it became ‘the place of the human’, who claimed the two attributes of God: Omniscience (hence the presentation of modern culture as scientistic: everything can be explained by science) and omnipotence (hence the insistence on the technical dimension of our culture).

Appealing methodologically to the etymology of terms, Heidegger identifies the *subject* as underlying ground that brings everything to the self, the *object* sending to what is disposed

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over against (Gegen-stand) the subject, as that what can be known and mastered. Hence the necessity to not reduce the individual to its quality of subject and to insist on the human as Dasein, as being situated in the proximity of something, taken into care, as being-with-others, as with-world, but also as a letting-be-of-the-godding-of-the-gods, which Heidegger captures under the designation of the last god. Actually, the godding of the gods (God’s godding) is presented from the perspective of the idea that being (Sein) gives itself through the 'fourfold structure' of the world (das Geviert), namely the unity between earth, sky, divinities, and mortals. The last god is defined as fullness of the gift of life, which through its messengers, the divinities present in the cultures of the world call the Dasein from inauthenticity towards authenticity: because only when it is together with the earth, with the sky, with divinities and with other mortals, more exactly together, an authentic world for Dasein is possible.21

To what extent did this philosophy affect its initiator’s course in life? This question becomes necessary in the present context of the discussions regarding Heidegger’s ‘unforgivable clumsiness’ from 1933, when, after ‘the most intelligent fascist speech’22 delivered when he was appointed rector of the University of Freiburg, Heidegger plunged – for a few long months – in the adventure of a politics based on a rudimentary and barbarous rhetoric. Although this mistake did not persist, in the years to follow, he never recognized and apologized publicly for the harm that he caused. Some of the persons that have been around him for a longer period of time (H.G. Gadamer, Max Müller, Karl Jaspers) repeatedly underlined that the man and the professor Martin Heidegger, seen from the perspective of the development of his life, in its most important stages, actually corresponded to the image of authenticity to which he aspired all the time: he longed for simplicity and for revealing the essence of things, he loved the hermitage – as medium of ascetics, also of ‘silence’ and ‘listening’ (in the sense developed Being and Time), and salvaged our access to Nietzsche and Hölderlin by depicting their thought in radically different images from the ones fabricated for them by the supporters of National-Socialism.

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21 And within the turning: Enowning must need Dasein and, needing it, must place it into the call and so bring it before the passing of the last god. Turning holds swai between the kall (to the one belonging) and the belonging (to the one who is called). Turning is counter – turning (Wieder – kehre). The call unto leaping - into enownwment is the grand stillness of the most sheltered and concealed self – knowing. All language of Da-sein has its origin here and is therefore essentially stillness (cf. Reservedness, enowning, truth, and language). As counter – turning enowning „is“ thus the highest mastery over the coming – toward and the flight of the gods who have been. The utmost god needs be-ing. (…) What resounds and spreads widely from within such belonging (Hörigkeit) is capable of preparing the strife of earth and world, for the truth of the there (Da) – and through the there (Da) the site above all for the moment of decision, and so for the strifing and thus for the sheltering in a being. (Martin Heidegger, 1999. Contributions to Philosophy, translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Indiana University Press, p. 287).